We are trying to get out of the risk zone that we have been in for the last 300 years, stuck in the geopolitical fault line between Russia and the West
Over the past two years, we have realized that we are not Russians, and we will never be together with Russians again. Historians don’t like the word “never,” but we have realized clearly that we are not Russians, there is a gap between us now. It is very important that the Russian imperial heritage is also dying, the Soviet heritage is dying, we can see it. For me, it is also important that the legacy of the unfinished, unsuccessful transformation that Ukraine had for 30 years is dying.
We can see this in the diminishing influence of oligarchs and the growing fight against corruption. Let me put it this way: the past is the past. We don’t know what will happen in the future, because it depends on the duration of this war and the price to be paid for victory. But we realize that we are making a very sharp leap forward.
We can use this metaphor: we had a very bad marriage with Russia, and we are finally getting a divorce. It looks like a final divorce, and we are going back to Europe. Now there is no doubt that Ukraine is part of Europe. On the one hand, this helps, of course, because we wanted it. But we see that very often it also hinders us, because we are accepted as part of Europe, part of the West, and because of this we are a victim of anti-American sentiment, particularly in the South, particularly in the conflict in the Gaza Strip.
To put it more geopolitically: we are trying to get out of the risk zone that we have been in for the last 300 years,
in the zone of the geopolitical fault line between Russia and the West. We are trying to enter the zone of peace. And this zone of peace is the zone of success – what we call the West – the European Union plus the United States of America.
I think this is maybe the biggest change we can dream of. Maybe it would have taken decades. Why is this war important? It’s a tragedy, but it accelerates processes quickly. In two or three years, we have passed the time that we could have passed in 20-30 years.
We got rid of the inferiority complex. We took ourselves seriously, asserting that we were different [from the Russians]. I am afraid the war may create a superiority complex in us, which I would not want either. But we realize that we are worthwhile. And not only do we understand this, but the world understands it. After the first weeks of the war, the admiration for Ukraine was global, and everyone was talking about it. We are getting rid of this complex. We are not inferior, we are normal.
But on the other hand, we understand, and it is obvious, that new victims have emerged in the past two years. And I don’t know yet how these victims will affect us, but this should be taken very seriously. This is what does not allow us to go along with this push that we are being forced to do, that “go ahead, sit down at the table with Putin, agree on everything.” The memory of these victims, the blood of these victims does not allow us to make such compromises. At least for now. I don’t know what the mood will be in the future, because a lot depends on what happens at the front.
What is particularly surprising to me is that after two years of war, after these severe trials that Ukraine has undergone, after the enormous sacrifices, public opinion is set on the idea that we want victory, we believe in victory, and this victory will mean the return of our occupied lands. When is another question, and at what cost is another question.
Believe me: after two years of war, having such a public opinion is a small miracle.
If before the war I used to hold Ukraine up as an example for other countries, now I hold Ukraine up as a model of behavior for other countries.
The war showed that the West exists. This is something Putin did not believe in. He believed that the West, the European value, was a fiction, that it was a fiction. That’s why he decided to go to war, because he remembered what happened in 2008 in the war against Georgia, what happened during the annexation of Crimea, that there was essentially no reaction.
This gave him the conviction that the West does not exist, and that what does exist is very weak. I must say that this is one of Putin’s mistakes, because the West does exist, and Ukraine has united it.
I must say that this is not the first time. The first two times we didn’t notice it, but in 2004, during the first Maidan, and in 2014, during the second Maidan, a very strong Brussels-Washington line appeared for the first time. This was not there before. This is very important.
Europe and the United States have often had very similar interests, but when it comes to Ukraine, their interests are united. Having said that, I don’t think there is enough aid. I think that Europe and the West in general had a huge problem, which was that they did not know what their future was.
We are now seeing that the United States is becoming a dysfunctional democracy, and it will be for a long time. Even after the election, it will be dysfunctional. This puts a question mark on their future. We did not have a question about the European Union, Brexit has shown that.
The formula in which the West exists, the European Union, is in crisis. And that’s why Europe needed something to reset – a very strong challenge. I believe that Ukraine has become this challenge.
I am not saying that Europe is doing it fast or enough. It is always slowing down and not doing enough. But we can see now the fact that so many prime ministers, leaders of countries, came to Ukraine on the second anniversary of the war. There is a feeling among the European elite (almost without exception) that this war will last for a long time, that Putin must be taken seriously. If we don’t help Ukraine now, the costs of a future war with Putin will be much higher than they are now. I’m not saying that this will be instantly transformed into aid. Unfortunately, no, because these are still words, and we need actions. But at least what has happened is important – the West is resetting, and Ukraine is part of the reset.
If we talk about the systemic elite, which comes from the parties that are now in power, which have a long history, they are now pro-Ukrainian. Moreover, they are now clearly saying that today is Ukraine, tomorrow is us, and we have to prepare for this. If we don’t help Ukraine now, tomorrow it will be us. These are all words, of course.
I was in Davos, and I was very impressed by the argument presented by the former President of Estonia (Kersti Kaljulaid – NV). She said that now in the Ramstein countries the level of aid to Ukraine does not reach 0.1%. She said: “If these countries tripled this share to 0.3%, it would be much more than Russia’s resources.”
What are we talking about? We are talking about a very small change, but a very important change. The question is: why doesn’t the West do this? Although now we have read statements that perhaps the level of aid will increase to 0.25%.
The systemic elite understands this and talks about it. The other thing is that we have what we call the word “ordinary people” who do not see and do not want to see, they believe that the war is far away. He is even tired of it. He hasn’t done anything yet, but he is already tired.
I have been to Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain, and many other countries, and I feel astonishment in conversations: are you still at war? Why don’t you stop fighting? The average person puts the blame for this war, strange as it may sound on Ukraine, on [President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy. They say that they are the ones who are so belligerent, and if they wanted to stop fighting, peace would have been made a while ago.
Why am I saying this? Because these ordinary people sometimes support those anti-systemic parties that exist. And they strive for power. I don’t know what will happen next, it’s hard to predict. There are elections everywhere now. So far, this threat is small, but it exists.
In Italy, there is a concept of people who read books and people who watch television. Those who read books are on our side, those who watch TV are already problematic. They know little, they are not well educated, they need very quick solutions. For some reason, they think that they are paying for this war, even though they are paying practically nothing.
It’s just like the strikes on the Polish-Ukrainian border, with farmers. The level of their own pockets is more disturbing for them than the level of their future, their children. This is a big problem, and this problem is related to the fact that Europe has not been at war for 70 years. It has lost the understanding of what war is. There are already three or four generations who do not even know what war is, they do not assess the level of threats.
The existence of these groups of people is not a threat to the future of Europe and the future of Ukraine, but they are a force that, unfortunately, must be reckoned with.
Yaroslav Hrytsak
Historian, professor of Ukrainian Catholic University for NV